

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 11006

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, IS, EG, US

SUBJECT: THE ISRAELI APPROACH TO THE CAMP DAVID SUMMIT

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1. SUMMARY: BEGIN WILL BE GOING TO CAMP DAVID PROCLAIMING
HIS FLEXIBILITY ON QUESTIONS OF AGENDA AND HIS READINESS
TO DISCUSS ALL ISSUES. HE WILL POINT TO THE GOI'S WILL-
INGNESS TO RETURN SINAI TO EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY, HIS
PROPOSAL TO ABOLISH THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MILITARY
GOVERNMENT AND TO LET WEST BANKERS AND GAZANS RULE THEM-
SELVES, AND THE GOI'S AGREEMENT TO DEFER THE QUESTION
OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE TERRITORIES. HE IS LIKELY TO HAVE
SOME ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS UP HIS SLEEVE, BUT THEY MAY
WELL TURN OUT TO BE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY VERBAL PERMUTA-
TIONS ON HIS EXISTING POSITIONS. THE ISRAELIS HOPE

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FINALLY TO CORNER SADAT INTO MAKING CLEAR COMMITMENTS ON
CERTAIN ISSUES HE HAS DEALT WITH AMBIGUOUSLY THUS FAR --
SECURITY MEASURES ON THE WEST BANK/GAZA AND READINESS TO
CONCLUDE AN ISRAEL/EGYPT PEACE TREATY IF GENERAL GUIDE-
LINES FOR A REGIME FOR THE WEST BANK/GAZA CAN BE AGREED
UPON. THE GOI IS APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE ROLE THE U.S.
WILL BE PLAYING AT CAMP DAVID, AND THE PRESIDENT'S

DEFINITION OF THE AMERICAN NEGOTIATING ROLE AS THAT OF A "FULL PARTNER" IS WARILY INTERPRETED AS AN INDICATION THAT THE U.S. COULD ADOPT A STANCE FAVORING EGYPT ON MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES. A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES IS VIEWED HERE NOT AS A GOAL IN ITSELF, BUT AS POSSIBLY A NECESSARY COMPONENT TO CONVINCE SADAT TO STRIKE A DEAL ON SINAI, WHERE THE ISRAELIS WILL WANT SADAT TO ADDRESS THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS: THE STATUS OF THE SETTLEMENTS IN THE RAFAH APPROACHES AND THE TWO SINAI AIRFIELDS. WITH RESPECT TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, SHOULD HUSSEIN BE UNWILLING TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE ISRAELIS WILL EXPECT SADAT TO TAKE MUCH OF THIS RESPONSIBILITY UPON HIMSELF. CONCERNING SECURITY, THE GOI WILL INSIST ON AN IDF STRATEGIC PRESENCE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA DURING AND AFTER THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, AND THAT THE IDF RETAIN FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND THE RIGHT TO PATROL THE JORDAN VALLEY. THE ISRAELIS WILL NOT AGREE TO DISMANTLE THE SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ON THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL, BEGIN IS UNLIKELY TO GO BEYOND HIS PRESENT INTERPRETATION OF RESOLUTION 242. HE MAY PROPOSE THE IDEA OF "PERMANENT PARTIAL AGREEMENTS," AS A FALLBACK, ALTHOUGH HE HAS UNDOUBTEDLY LOST SOME CONFIDENCE IN THE UTILITY OF THIS APPROACH FOLLOWING SADAT'S UNEQUIVOCAL REJECTION OF IT. BEGIN AND DAYAN DO NOT VIEW CAMP DAVID AS A NOW-OR-NEVER OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE BUT THEY ARE FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THE MOMENTOUS CHARACTER OF THE MOMENT AND DO NOT
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INTEND TO COME AWAY TARRED WITH THE BRUSH OF FAILURE IF THEY CAN POSSIBLY HELP IT. WEIZMAN SEES CAMP DAVID AS THE MOMENT OF TRUTH AND INTENDS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY

2. ISRAELI LEADERS HAVE BEEN UNUSUALLY RETICENT PUBLICLY IN EXPRESSING EXPECTATIONS AND INTENTIONS AS PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMP DAVID SUMMIT CONTINUE. BEGIN'S PUBLIC AFFIRMATIONS OF A DESIRE TO MOVE TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OR, ALTERNATIVELY, A "PERMANENT PARTIAL AGREEMENT" HAVE SHED LITTLE LIGHT ON WHAT SPECIFIC POSITIONS AND APPROACHES THE ISRAELI TEAM IS CONSIDERING. MUCH OF WHAT FOLLOWS IS THEREFORE SPECULATIVE AND REPRESENTS OUR BEST GUESS AS TO WHAT ISRAELIS WILL PROBABLY BE UP TO AT THE SUMMIT. SOME IS BASED ON THE AMBASSADOR'S RECENT PRIVATE TALKS WITH DAYAN AND WEIZMAN. (PRE-DEPARTURE MEETING WITH BEGIN SCHEDULED TO BE HELD AFTER COMPLETION OF THIS MESSAGE.)

3. THE ISRAELI DELEGATION HEADED BY PRIME MINISTER BEGIN WILL BE GOING TO CAMP DAVID PROCLAIMING ITS FLEXIBILITY ON QUESTIONS OF AGENDA AND READINESS TO DISCUSS ALL

ISSUES. BEGIN WILL PROBABLY TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT HE IS LOOKING FOR A BREAKTHROUGH WHICH WILL PUT THE NEGOTIATIONS BACK ON TRACK, AND BEGIN INTIMATES STRESS HOW MUCH BEGIN BELIEVES IS RIDING ON THESE MEETINGS; FOR HIM AS WELL AS FOR ISRAEL. BEGIN WILL STRESS HIS INTEREST IN EXPLORING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT WHICH STILL PREVENT A PEACE TREATY. HE WILL EMPHASIZE THAT HIS POSITION IS HARDLY THAT OF "NOT ONE INCH"; RATHER, HE WILL

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POINT TO THE GOI'S WILLINGNESS TO RETURN SINAI TO EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY, ITS PROPOSAL TO ABOLISH THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND TO LET WEST BANKERS AND GAZANS RULE THEMSELVES, AND ITS AGREEMENT TO DEFER THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE TERRITORIES.

4. THE ISRAELIS WILL COME EQUIPPED WITH A PLETHORA OF DRAFTS AND PRONOUNCEMENTS -- THE GOI PEACE PLAN, A DRAFT PEACE TREATY, THE MARCH 22 DRAFT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND AN ANNOUNCED WILLINGNESS TO ENTERTAIN CHANGES IN THESE PROPOSALS. THEY WILL ALSO HAVE IN RESERVE DAYAN'S KNESSET PRONOUNCEMENTS ON TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE AND

SOVEREIGNTY AND BEGIN'S RECENT SUGGESTION OF "PARTIAL
PERMANENT AGREEMENTS." THE GOI WILL PROCLAIM ITSELF,
PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, READY TO MEET THE EGYPTIANS HALF-
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WAY IN AN EFFORT TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
AND WILL HAVE A HOST OF ALTERNATE COMPROMISE FORMULATIONS
AT HAND. IN THIS WAY, THE ISRAELIS HOPE TO CORNER SADAT
FINALLY INTO ADDRESSING UNAMBIGUOUSLY CERTAIN KEY ISSUES
HE HAS DEALT WITH ONLY AMBIGUOUSLY IN THE PAST WITH
WEIZMAN AND PERES. IF HE IS NOT PREPARED TO DEAL WITH
WHAT THE ISRAELIS CONSIDER THE CORE ISSUES -- SECURITY
MEASURES ON THE WEST BANK/GAZA AND READINESS TO CONCLUDE
AN ISRAEL-EGYPT PEACE TREATY IF GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR
A REGIME FOR THE WEST BANK/GAZA CAN BE AGREED UPON -- THEN
THE ISRAELIS WILL HOLD SADAT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUMMIT'S
FAILURE, AND WILL HOPE TO PERSUADE THE U.S. PUBLIC AND
CONGRESS - AS WELL AS THE ADMINISTRATION - THAT THEY ARE
RIGHT.

5. TRUE TO FORM, THE ISRAELIS ARE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE
ROLE THE U.S. WILL BE PLAYING AT CAMP DAVID. SADAT'S AND
PRESIDENT CARTER'S DEFINITION OF THE AMERICAN NEGOTIATING
ROLE AS THAT OF A "FULL PARTNER" IS INTERPRETED HERE AS
FURTHER INDICATION THAT THE U.S. COULD ADOPT A STANCE
FAVORING EGYPT ON MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES. ALTHOUGH THEY
ACCEPT AT FACE VALUE AMERICAN DENIALS THAT A U.S. PLAN
WILL BE TABLED AT CAMP DAVID, THE ISRAELIS ARE SKITTISH
OVER THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTENTIONS TO INTRODUCE ITS OWN
IDEAS IN THE COURSE OF BRIDGING ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN DIFFER-
ENCES. DESPITE HIS RECENT STATEMENTS THAT HE HOPES THE
PRESIDENT WILL LIMIT HIMSELF TO A MEDIATOR'S ROLE, BEGIN
WILL MAKE A STRONG EFFORT TO LINE UP THE PRESIDENT BEHIND
AS MANY OF THE ISRAELI POSITIONS AS POSSIBLE AND, TO THE
EXTENT HE CAN, RESIST THE TRANSFORMATION OF INFORMAL
AMERICAN "IDEAS" INTO FORMAL U.S. PROPOSALS.

6. THE MOST LIKELY ISRAELI APPROACH AT CAMP DAVID APPEARS
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TO BE AN EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH SADAT ON CERTAIN
BASIC ISSUES AND THE METHOD OF IMPLEMENTING ANY SUCH
AGREEMENT. DISCUSSION ON A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, IF
DESIRED BY SADAT TO ENTICE HUSSEIN INTO THE NEGOTIATING
PROCESS, AND IF NECESSARY TO GET A DEAL ON SINAI, COULD BE
PURSUED. THE DECLARATION IS VIEWED HERE NOT SO MUCH AS

A GOAL IN ITSELF AS POSSIBLE A NECESSARY COMPONENT FOR A BARGAIN WITH SADAT. BUT THE ISRAELIS WILL WANT SADAT TO DECLARE HIS WILLINGNESS TO CONCLUDE A PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL IF THE GENERAL OUTLINE OF A WEST BANK/GAZA REGIME CAN BE AGREED UPON. ELEMENTS OF SUCH A REGIME WOULD BE A PERHAPS MODIFIED FORM OF SELF-RULE AS OUTLINED IN THE GOI PEACE PLAN, SOME STRATEGIC IDF PRESENCE DURING AND AFTER THE FIVE-YEAR INTERIM PERIOD, AND THE CONTINUING RIGHT OF JEWS TO LIVE, SETTLE AND BUY LAND IN THE WEST BANK, PERHAPS QUALIFIED OR CONSTRAINED IN SOME AGREED FASHION. THE LATTER POINT CLEARLY RULES OUT THE REMOVAL OF EXISTING ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS. IN RETURN FOR THIS, THE GOI WOULD NOT ONLY DISMANTLE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT--IN CONFORMITY WITH THE SELF-RULE PLAN -- BUT COULD ALSO CONSIDER THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOME IDF FORCES IN THE CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION ON SECURITY MEASURES AND POSSIBLY AT BEST DECIDE TO AGREE UNAMBIGUOUSLY THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE WILL BE RESOLVED AFTER FIVE YEARS. THE ISRAELI TEAM WOULD ALSO WELCOME AN EXCHANGE OF IDEAS ON JOINT COOPERATION ON PREVENTING TERRORISM LAUNCHED AGAINST ISRAEL FROM THE WEST BANK. HUSSEIN WOULD BE EXPECTED TO TAKE ON SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE JORDANIAN ROLE IN SELF RULE REGIME. HAVING REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE OUTLINE OF A WEST BANK REGIME, THE ISRAELIS WOULD EXPECT EGYPT TO

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AGREE TO STEPS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A BILATERAL PEACE TREATY. IN ANY CASE, THE AGREEMENTS THAT WOULD BE REACHED WITH SADAT AT CAMP DAVID WOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR RESUMPTION OF MINISTERIAL NEGOTIATIONS ON POLITICAL AND DEFENSE SUBJECTS. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ELABORATE ON ASPECTS OF THE ABOVE.

7. ONE BASIC ISSUE THE ISRAELI TEAM WILL WANT SADAT TO DISCUSS IS THAT OF A PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL. EVEN IF THEY DO NOT PRODUCE THEIR DRAFT PEACE TREATY IMMEDIATELY, THE ISRAELIS WILL WANT SADAT TO PRESENT HIS DEFINITION OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS AND TO ADDRESS THE UNRESOLVED SINAI PROBLEMS: THE STATUS OF THE SETTLEMENTS IN THE RAFAH APPROACHES AND THE TWO SINAI AIRFIELDS THE ISRAELIS WISH TO RETAIN. THE ISRAELI TEAM MAY WELL RESURFACE A
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PROPOSAL FOR TERRITORIAL EXCHANGE IN SINAI TO BREAK THE IMPASSE ON THESE QUESTIONS, ALTHOUGH THE IDEA OF A DIRECT AMERICAN ROLE IN SUBSTITUTION FOR ISRAELI CONTROL OF THE AIRFIELDS SEEMS TO BE GAINING GROUND STEADILY HERE.

8. ANOTHER BASIC ISSUE IS THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL, SECURITY AND REFUGEE ASPECTS. WHILE THE BEGIN SELF-RULE PLAN IS ISRAEL'S SUGGESTED RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE, THE ISRAELIS STOUTLY MAINTAIN THAT THE PROPOSAL IS OPEN TO NEGOTIATION. THEY WILL WANT SADAT TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF JORDAN'S ROLE IN BOTH THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND IN THE SELF-RULE SCHEME. SHOULD HUSSEIN CONTINUE TO BE UNWILLING TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE ISRAELIS WILL EXPECT SADAT TO TAKE MUCH OF THIS RESPONSIBILITY UPON HIMSELF. IN THE COURSE OF THEIR POLICY PLANNING FOR THE SUMMIT, THE ISRAELIS WILL HAVE DEVELOPED AND MAY ADVANCE ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS DRAWN FROM OR SUGGESTED BY THE OVERLAP OF THE ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS AT LEEDS, THE U.S. END-OF-OCCUPATION CONCEPT, AND POSSIBLY "CLARIFICATIONS" OF THE SELF-RULE PLAN ITSELF. THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM AND A MECHANISM FOR ALLOWING THE RETURN OF SOME REFUGEES WILL BE RAISED BY DAYAN IN THE ISRAELI EFFORT TO SHOW THEY ARE SERIOUS ABOUT DEALING WITH THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

9. TO MOST ISRAELIS, SECURITY IS THE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT ISSUE IN THE PALESTINIAN PACKAGE, ALTHOUGH IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS CERTAINLY PLAY A LARGE PART WITH BEGIN AND OTHERS IN POLICY FORMULATION. IN GENERAL, THE GOI

WILL INSIST ON SOME IDF PRESENCE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA DURING AND AFTER THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD AND THAT THE IDF RETAIN FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THE TERRITORIES AND THE RIGHT TO PATROL THE JORDAN VALLEY. FIXED EARLY WARNING
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STATIONS ON THE WEST BANK RIDGELINE WILL ALSO BE REQUIRED.

10. IN ADDITION, THE GOI HAS REPEATEDLY SAID THAT IT IS WILLING TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY A CONCRETE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL FOR TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. HOWEVER, SUCH A CONCRETE PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE TO BE SPECIFIC AND -- AS DISTINCT FROM THE CONCEPT OF THE 1967 BORDER WITH MINOR MODIFICATIONS -- REQUIRE A SUBSTANTIAL DIVISION OF TERRITORY WITH REAL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. GIVEN KAMEL'S NEGATIVE RESPONSE AT LEEDS TO DAYAN'S RAISING OF THE POSSIBILITY OF TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE, ISRAELIS DOUBT THAT THE EGYPTIANS WILL PICK UP ON THIS CONCEPT. IF THEY DID, IT WOULD BE EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT FOR BEGIN TO HANDLE - IN VIEW OF HIS OWN IDEOLOGICAL POSITION OVER HIS WHOLE CAREER. AS FOR THE JERUSALEM QUESTION, THE ISRAELIS WILL ATTEMPT TO HAVE SADAT REITERATE FOR THE RECORD A POINT HE MADE TO WEIZMAN THAT JERUSALEM WILL REMAIN A UNITED CITY, WHATEVER FINAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE WORKED OUT.

11. AS CLOSE FOLLOWERS OF THE EGYPTIAN MEDIA, THE ISRAELIS HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT AT CAMP DAVID SADAT WILL BE FOCUSING ON A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND WAYS THE TWO PRIMARY ELEMENTS -- WITHDRAWAL AND PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION -- CAN BE IMPLEMENTED. AS NOTED IN PARA 6, THE ISRAELIS MAY WANT A DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS TO ACCOMPANY CONSIDERATION OF A DECLARATION. HOWEVER, IF FORCED TO DISCUSS PRINCIPLES IN ISOLATION, THE ISRAELIS HAVE SAID THAT THEIR MARCH 22 DRAFT DECLARATION REPRESENTS THE MAXIMUM BEGIN WILL AGREE TO. BUT SHOULD THERE BE MOVEMENT BY SADAT ON THE CONCRETE ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE ISRAELIS, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE GOI MAY BE ABLE TO ACCEPT MORE OF THE ASWAN

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THAT THE GOI MAY BE ABLE TO ACCEPT MORE OF THE ASWAN
LANGUAGE THAN IT HAS IN THE PAST.

12. ON THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL, BEGIN IS UNLIKELY TO
GO BEYOND THE PRESENT ISRAELI INTERPRETATION OF RESOLUTION
242. IN RESPONSE TO SADAT'S PRESUMED INTEREST IN PINNING
DOWN THE GOI ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AND A TIMETABLE FOR
WITHDRAWAL, AS REFLECTED IN THE EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL,
THE ISRAELIS WOULD TRY TO SUBSUME THIS ISSUE IN THE CON-
TEXT OF A DISCUSSION OF ISRAELI SECURITY MEASURES. THE
ISRAELIS WILL PROBABLY ARGUE THAT IT IS ILLOGICAL FOR
SADAT TO WANT TO DISCUSS ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS BEFORE A
DISCUSSION OF WHAT IDF PRESENCE SHALL REMAIN. IN ADDITION
BEGIN IS LIKELY TO NOTE THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A
REDUCTION OF MILITARY FORCES IS INHERENT IN THE SELF-RULE
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PLAN'S PROPOSAL FOR A DISMANTLING OF THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT. HE MAY SAY THAT WITHDRAWAL
OF TROOPS IS NOT SO MUCH A DISCRETE ISSUE AS A SECONDARY
ELEMENT FOLLOWING AGREEMENT, BASED ON THE SELF-RULE PLAN
AND ON THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. AS FOR THE
PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION, THE ISRAELIS PROBABLY
ASSUME THAT SADAT'S BOTTOM LINE IS THE ASWAN DECLARATION
LANGUAGE. THEREFORE, THE ISRAELIS WILL TRY TO SELL TO THE
U.S. THE THOUGHT THAT SOME VERSION OF THE SELF-RULE PLAN,
IN WHICH THE PALESTINIAN ARABS PARTICIPATE IN THE DETER-
MINATION OF THEIR FUTURE THROUGH TALKS, SHOULD BE SUFFI-

CIENT TO SATISFY SADAT'S POLITICAL NEEDS IF HE IS SERIOUS ABOUT ACHIEVING AN AGREEMENT.

13. IN THE CONTEXT OF WORKING OUT A DECLARATION, THE "VIENNA DOCUMENT" DOES PROVIDE SOME USEFUL COMPROMISE FORMULATIONS. HOWEVER, THE DOCUMENT'S IDENTIFICATION WITH OPPOSITION LEADER PERES MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR BEGIN TO ACCEPT IT AS ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE. MOREOVER, KAMEL NOW INSISTS THAT SADAT NEVER AGREED TO IT, CONTRARY TO PERES' VERSION OF WHAT TRANSPIRED.

14. BEGIN HAS BEEN PUBLICLY PROMOTING THE IDEA OF "PERMANENT PARTIAL AGREEMENTS" AS A FALLBACK TO EFFORTS FOR COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT. THESE HE CONCEIVES AS ELEMENTS OF A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT WHICH COULD BE RESOLVED IN ASCENDING ORDER OF DIFFICULTY. THUS, RIGHT NOW IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO AGREE TO A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IN SINAI IN RETURN FOR ELEMENTS OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS, SUCH AS A PERMANENT REPLACEMENT FOR SINAI II. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY THAT HAS BEEN MOOTED IS A RETURN OF EL ARISH TO EGYPTIAN CIVILIAN RULE IN RETURN FOR SUEZ CANAL PASSAGE FOR ISRAELI SHIPS. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR THE GOI OF
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SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE RECIPROCITY, AND EACH AGREEMENT WOULD BE A BUILDING BLOCK FOR AND A COMPONENT OF FINAL OVERALL SETTLEMENT. BEGIN HAS UNDOUBTEDLY LOST SDME CONFIDENCE IN THE UTILITY OF THIS TYPE OF APPROACH FOLLOWING SADAT'S UNEQUIVOCAL REJECTION AND THE U.S.'S MARKED LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR IT. NEVERTHELESS, THIS REMAINS A PART OF BEGIN'S REPERTOIRE.

15. BEGIN AND DAYAN, UNLIKE WEIZMAN, HAVE SAID PUBLICLY THAT ALTHOUGH THE SUMMIT IS A VERY IMPORTANT EVENT, IT IS NOT NECESSARILY THE LAST CHANCE TO GET THE NEGOTIATIONS BACK ON TRACK. THEY SAY THEY DO NOT VIEW CAMP DAVID AS A NOW-OR-NEVER OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE, AND IN EXPRESSING THESE VIEWS THEY HAVE, TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT, MUTED THE ISRAELI PUBLIC'S EXPECTATIONS OF A BREAKTHROUGH. THEY HAVE TRIED TO CONVINCE THE PUBLIC THAT THE PEACE PROCESS IS BY NOW A PART OF THE MIDDLE EAST SCENE; IN THE END A RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES WILL BE FOUND. PRIVATELY, HOWEVER, BEGIN ACKNOWLEDGES TO HIS INTIMATES HOW MUCH IS RIDING FOR HIM PERSONALLY AND FOR ISRAEL ON THE CAMP DAVID OUTCOME. DAYAN IS EQUALLY AWARE OF THE STAKES. AND FOR WEIZMAN, THIS IS THE MOMENT OF TRUTH. LEWIS

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